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The Secretary said it wasn't clear yet whether or not there should
be a communique. The President opposes communiques and so does
the Prime Minister, he said, unless they actually say something. If we
can reach some agreements and if the world can be told about them,
he thought we should make a statement.
Mr. Lloyd said that he will be here all day Sunday and on Tuesday afternoon and evening. He hoped it would be possible to see the
Secretary again in order to discuss subjects other than the Middle East
which he had in mind, particularly reduction of forces in Germany,
and to exchange further ideas about next week's talks.
The Secretary and Mr. Lloyd agreed to meet again on Tuesday.

309.

Memorandum From the Ambassador to Canada (Merchant)
to the Secretary of State1
Washington, October 19, 1957.

It seems to me that the forthcoming talks between the President
and Mr. Macmillan are crucial to our position of world leadership, and
among other things to the future of NATO.
Without desiring to appear unduly cynical I think that the request
by Mr. Macmillan for the meeting constitutes a supreme effort by the
British to regain their war-time position of exclusive and equal partnership with the U.S. To their attainment of this objective they have
tossed to the wolves their partner in their Suez adventure a year ago,
France, with a cynicism which I doubt the French will easily or quickly
forget.
From the point of view of the stakes and British purposes Mr.
Macmillan has found himself, possibly unexpectedly, dealt a remarkably good hand. France without a government has superficially lost her
claim to a seat at the table; Soviet threats against Turkey have created
an atmosphere of crisis; Sputnik has called into question all through
the world the accepted leadership of the U.S. in technology and, by
extension, a superior capacity for fighting and winning modem war;
'Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 927. Secret.
Drafted by Merchant. A handwritten note by Merchant, the coordinator of the Washington conference, appears at the top of the source text: "The Secretary-Sir: Here is my
'cynical' paper I mentioned to you this afternoon-no distribution except you though I
showed it to Jock Whitney who did not react violently! Livie."
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lastly, the Queen's visit to the U.S. is proving a romantic success and
can be expected to leave in its wake a sentimental softness for all
proposals British.
All cynicism aside, I believe and feel strongly that it is in our
interest to readmit the British to a far closer and more responsible
partnership with us. They have more to contribute to our own survival
than any other nation, with the possible exception of Canada. And on
the latter point, the closer we tie the British to us, the tighter will be
our bond with Canada.
I think we should embark on this closer (and more equal) partnership with the British with our eyes open. We should appreciate that if
we assert, in partnership with the British, world leadership, we will
send shivers down the backs of most of our allies in NATO and among
all our allies in the rest of the world. If having asserted this claim to
joint global leadership we fail adequately to exercise it, then I think we
will alienate so many friends as to destroy the effectiveness of NATO
and bring into question the reliability of many other allies. This is not
so much a case of "nothing succeeds like success", as a case of "failure
will bring total failure". For example, in NATO terms we are setting
up, in effect, a NATO Political Standing Group of just the British and
ourselves. This will not only slay the French, but disappoint the hopes
of the Germans and others who have had pretensions to a position of
being co-partners in leadership to at least the degree which the French
have maintained.
In substance, the British are asking a great deal of us. I believe we
should seek from them what is of value to us and in their power to
give. The following elements immediately come to mind:
1. An acceptance by the British that they will have to pay in coin,
even at great risk to the Exchequer, a substantial share of the costs of
the partnership. They can't ask for a 50% interest in the political
profits and then draw down their share in the firm's assets from 30%
to 10%. This means, for example, that they cannot on grounds of
poverty take the flat position that if Germany refuses to pay all of the
support costs for their troops they will withdraw all of their forces
from Europe nor that they should shove off on us the responsibility for
subsidy payments such as they had made to Jordan and I believe are
still making to Libya. They will have to increase their financial risks,
albeit in the knowledge that if in the long run sterling is really heading
to disaster, we will have to bail them out in our own interests.
2. In the Far East where our policies have been more divergent,
with particular reference to attitudes regarding Communist China, it is
only reasonable that the British should move toward our position even
if they do not come all the way at once, and certainly at a minimum
we can ask for a firmer commitment on Chinese representation in the
UN than the haggling year to year arrangement we have so far been
compelled painfully to extract from them.
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3. I think we have the right to ask them to overhaul their relations
with Saudi Arabia, presumably at the cost of the Burami oasis. In
return I would think we should assure them a stouter and more forthright public position for their position and actions in the Trucial states
and Yemen.
4. I imagine there is a good deal they can provide us in scientific
advances and developments, particularly in the field of missiles and
weaponry. I think they should be generous in this respect particularly
in light of the presumption that we will liberalize our own attitude on
certain scientific exchanges.
5. Finally, for what it is worth, I think we should ask the British to
adopt publicly at least a less disillusioned attitude toward the U.N. It is
only asking them to keep their payments up on a long range policy of
questionable but possible future value.
In conclusion and in summary, the British are making a bold bid
under circumstances which are fortuitously favorable to them. I think
we should respond affirmatively in our own interests. We should do
so, however, with our eyes open to the risks we are taking and we
should certainly ask in return from the British such quids as they have
at their command.
Livingston T. Merchant

Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President1
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Washington, October 21, 1957.
SUBJECT
Your Talks with Prime Minister Macmillan, October 24 and 25

As you know, Prime Minister Macmillan is coming this week to
consider with you the present state of our alliance and problems related to it. Enclosed is a summary briefing paper which contains my
ideas of the purposes of the conference and in general terms how we
may achieve them. I am also enclosing a tentative schedule of the
agenda items for the two main meetings between you and the Prime
Minister.
John Foster Dulles 2

2

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/10-2157. Secret.
Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.
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